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ABSTRACT Both international forest and climate negotiations have failed to produce a legally
binding treaty that addresses forest management activities—either comprehensively or more
narrowly through carbon capture– due, in part, to lack of US leadership. Though US cooperation is
crucial for facilitating both forest and climate negotiations, the role of federalism in constraining
these trends has been given scant attention. We argue that, as embodied in the US Constitution,
federalism complicates the US’s role in creating any legally binding treaty that directly regulates
land uses (e.g. forest management). Because federalism reserves primary land use regulatory
authority for state governments, voluntary, market-based mechanisms, like REDD and forest certifi-
cation, should be included within any binding treaty aimed at forest management, in order to facilitate
US participation.
Since the late 1980s, countries promoting formal global action on forest management
practices have been disappointed, as attempts to forge a legally binding international
forest treaty have met great difficulty. As Dimitrov et al. (2006) describe, numerous inter-
national fora have considered the creation of such a treaty: the 1992 UN Conference on
the Environment and Development (UNCED); four sessions of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Forests between 1995 and 1997; four rounds of the Intergovernmental Forum on
Forests between 1997 and 2000; and sessions of the United Nations Forum on Forests
(UNFF) in the 2000s (also see Gueneau & Tozzi, 2008).1 These efforts have been
described as ‘a resounding failure’ (Dimitrov, 2003, p. 134).2 The causes of their failure
are varied. At UNCED conflicts erupted over trade issues between developed and devel-
oping countries, stifling agreement on a ‘new legal instrument on forests’ (Dimitrov,
2003, p. 135). Both at UNCED and subsequent forest conferences, progress has been
stymied by developing countries concerned that a binding treaty would negatively affect
developing economies by regulating tropical forests more stringently than the temperate
and boreal forests of the developed world (Dimitrov, 2003). As the use of market-based
mechanisms to address global forest issues has become more popular, this concern has
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morphed into a fear of ‘forest colonialism’, whereby the developed world would pay for
the right to continue emitting carbon into the atmosphere while at the same time limiting
development of forested lands in the developing world (Griffiths, 2007). Perhaps the most
significant impediment to treaty formation, however, has been the US’s inability to con-
sistently support a legally binding international forest management agreement (Davenport,
2005; Dimitrov, 2005).3
Nevertheless, national governments have continued to discuss mechanisms for achieving
global forest management. The UNFF, which concluded its 8th session in May 2009,
remains the primary forum for what may be termed ‘stand-alone’ forest negotiations, which
aim to promote sustainable forestry, preserve the varied ecosystem services provided by
forests and address climate change. The role of carbon in forest management is also a focal
point of the post-Kyoto climate negotiations, as national governments are increasingly
seeking creative solutions, both regulatory and market-based, to address climate change.
The US Congress, for instance, has considered numerous bills (e.g. Lieberman-Warner Cli-
mate Security Act of 2007, Dingell-Boucher Draft Legislation of 2008, American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009 [Waxman-Markey Bill]) seeking to implement a carbon
cap-and-trade scheme for regulating industrial carbon outputs. Because forest carbon
sequestration capability provides a potentially significant solution to the climate change
problem, there is movement toward including global forest management within climate
change discussions, such as the upcoming UN Climate Change Conference number fifteen
(COP-15), and rolling forest management into a post-Kyoto climate framework (Karsenty
et al., 2008; Johns et al., 2008; Angelsen, 2008; Levin et al., 2008).4
Will a legally binding stand-alone forest treaty emerge from future UNFF negotiations?
Will a post-Kyoto climate treaty provide a significant role for the management of forests
as carbon sinks, in both the developed and the developing world? What mechanisms might
such treaties employ to address forest management, and what requirements might they
place upon participating countries?
These questions are particularly important to the US—viewed as crucial to the success
of both climate and international forest negotiations (Davenport, 2005)—because the US’s
own domestic governance structure complicates its role in the creation of any legally bind-
ing treaty that involves the potential direct regulation of land use by the federal govern-
ment. The US’s governmental system of federalism, engrained in the US Constitution5
and receiving staunch protection by the US judiciary (Watts, 1987), causes domestic
implementation of certain international forest governance scenarios to be more viable than
others. We argue that implementation and promotion of voluntary, market-based forest pro-
grammes would allow the US to agree to, and implement, a binding treaty that includes for-
est management, as the federal government would not then engage in the direct, prescriptive
regulation of private lands—a role reserved primarily for state governments under the US
federal system.6 Such programmes could help avoid failure of treaty implementation in the
US caused by ex post facto judicial challenges to the domestic validity of the treaty.
While scholarly works have focused on decentralized mechanisms for international forest
governance, domestic institutional structures like federalism have largely been absent
from the debate on international forest management regime formation.7 This is an import-
ant gap, especially when Glück et al. (2009) argue that a forest regime should provide
mechanisms that allow the greatest degree of flexibility in managing forests in order to
achieve desired results on the ground—that is, a ‘bottom-up’ approach. They contend that
forest governance—given increasing international negotiations on forests—should retreat
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from prescriptive approaches, or ‘traditional governance’, and should instead focus on
results-based approaches, precisely because ‘traditional governance, focusing on a hierar-
chical, top-down style of policy formulation and implementation of the nation state and
the use of regulatory policy instruments, will be incompatible with this demand for
flexibility’ (Glück et al., 2009, p. 4).8
Though theirs is a well-studied ‘outside-in’ limitation on traditional governance (with
‘outside’ international negotiations impacting internal domestic regulatory forest policy),
there exists a little discussed ‘inside-out’ limitation as well, as domestic governance struc-
tures, such as US federalism, also place limits on traditional forest governance at the
national and international levels.9 Analysis of such inside-out limitations is critical given
that the US, as one of the key participants needed to successfully implement an effective
treaty, is governed by a constitutionally entrenched federal system. Because the US fed-
eral system divulges primary private land use regulatory authority from the federal
government and places it within the hands of state governments, we argue that voluntary,
non-prescriptive market-based mechanisms, like forest certification, ecosystem service
transaction programmes, and reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation
(REDD) programmes, embody the types of voluntary mechanisms that are preconditions
for allowing US participation in any legally binding treaty that includes global forest man-
agement.10 Global forest governance has experienced a general ‘downward shift from
national to sub-national levels’, or, decentralization (Glück et al., 2005, p. 55), which has
facilitated the use of such non-prescriptive mechanisms. US federalism, however, repre-
sents a specific legal constitutional requirement for decentralization, whereby a national
government is judicially required to divulge regulatory authority to sub-national units (the
states) in the area of direct forest management.11 This, in turn, limits the types of interna-
tional treaties that may be implemented relating to forests, at least as applied to the US.
Going forward, we contend that the US would likely be more inclined to take a leader-
ship role in the area of binding global forest governance if it does not perceive domestic
legal limitations on its ability to implement a treaty aimed at forests. We develop this
argument through a legal analysis, complete with an assessment of the resulting policy
effects, to demonstrate how US federalism might best coexist with global governance of
forests. Part II describes the role of the US in influencing and shaping international forest
discussions and explains how its domestic system of federalism affects that role. Part III
examines the case of Missouri v. Holland, which supports the legal argument that the US
federal government may not directly regulate certain private land uses, such as forest man-
agement, despite entering into a binding international treaty for the protection of natural
resources. Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion summarizing why market-based,
voluntary mechanisms could pave the way for the US to support, and agree to, global trea-
ties aimed at forest management.
The US—A Federalist Veto Player?
The primary forum facilitating debate on global governance of forests is the UNFF. It has
sought to promote sustainable forestry, address climate change, and preserve the varied
ecosystem services provided by forests. International negotiations leading up to the cur-
rent UNFF talks, however, have failed to achieve binding global forest governance.12
Additionally, the UNFCC is increasingly considering forest management in the context of
climate change, with current emphasis on the development of REDD programmes that
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have the potential to improve carbon credit and offset markets globally.13 UNFCC negoti-
ations, however, have failed to establish, in a binding instrument, a significant role for for-
ests in mitigating atmospheric carbon.14
Regardless of the forum in which binding global forest management may eventually
manifest, the participation of the US is crucial. Without uncompromised US participation,
a future climate treaty, like Kyoto before it, is unlikely to materialize in a form that ade-
quately addresses forest degradation and/or global carbon emissions in the most compre-
hensive and effective manner. Given that the US is one of the greatest emitters of
industrial carbon emissions in the world (highest per capita), and that it is already consid-
ering regulation of industrial carbon domestically, bolstering the carbon market by includ-
ing forests may result in reduced US opposition to a post-Kyoto international climate
treaty. The US has long sought flexibility mechanisms, such as carbon offsets, to reduce
the economic strain of potential international carbon regulation,15 and has included such
mechanisms in various iterations of its own domestic legislative carbon proposals. Forests
provide such flexibility and may be seen by the US as a key component to its cooperation
on carbon in the international arena.16
The US’s support and leadership is also recognized as a necessary part of any
stand-alone treaty that seeks to capture both carbon and non-carbon related values of sus-
tainable forest management (see Davenport, 2005). Yet, recently the US has forged a
‘powerful veto coalition in opposition to any further internationally binding instrument’
on forest management (Scholz, 2004, p. 9). Past US opposition to a forest treaty is not
attributable to concerns over federalism, as it appears that federalism has yet to be raised
as a potential impediment to domestic forest treaty implementation.17 Rather, US opposi-
tion has arisen out of a domestic political shift prioritizing national sovereignty in the for-
est sector over binding international harmonization of forest practices (Scholz, 2004).
Though policy-driven domestic political issues hamstrung US negotiators in both previ-
ous forest management and climate talks,18 the domestic issues that could potentially
derail a future treaty including forest management are largely technical and have a legal
basis. Future international efforts to secure and implement binding forest management
practices may fail because highly controversial aspects of natural resource management in
the US, grounded in American constitutional law, may hinder it from taking a leadership
role. If the US takes note of an important potential domestic legal obstacle, largely ignored
by scholarship, it may be less inclined to lead regarding global governance of forests.
Namely, the US’s constitutional system of federalism creates difficulties for Congress
when attempting to implement binding land use regulations through the use of prescriptive
‘traditional governance’, driven by inflexible, hierarchical and top-down regulatory pol-
icies, even if mandated by Congress via international treaty.
For instance, prescriptive international forest management directives requiring the
implementation of nation-wide mandates on public and privately owned lands would
likely prohibit US participation in the treaty because its federal system divides land use
regulatory powers between the federal and state governments.19 Whereas central govern-
ments own roughly 86% of the world’s forests and wooded areas worldwide (Agrawal
et al., 2008), US state and federal governments only own 40% of US forestland, with the
remaining 60% in private ownership. Furthermore, it is estimated that almost 89% of the
timber harvested in the US comes from private lands (Yale, 2009).
In turn, private land use regulation is primarily reserved for state governments, to exer-
cise as a ‘police power’ for protection of the ‘general welfare’.20 The entire suite of police
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powers available to the states is not delegated to the federal government under the Consti-
tution, and the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution reserves for the states all powers not
so delegated. Scholars have noted that ‘[t]he weight of legal and political opinion holds
that this allocation of power in [the US] leaves the states in charge of regulating how pri-
vate land is used’ (Nolan, 2008, p. 17), and that ‘[l]and use law has always been a creature
of state and local law’ (Hamilton, 2003, p. 335). Most importantly, the US Supreme Court
has recognized ‘the States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use’ (Solid Waste,
2001, p. 174),21 and that ‘regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity’
(FERC, 1982, p. 767).
Of course, private land use activities remain subject to federal regulation passed pursuant
to other sources of authority under the Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause or
treaty-making power. In fact, a number of federal regulations have an effect on private
landowner activities without violating the Tenth Amendment. Both the federal Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) and Clean Water Act (CWA), each passed by Congress pursuant
to its Commerce Clause power, limit private property owners’ land use rights to a degree.
Specifically with regard to forests, the ESA affects landowner ability to undertake certain
logging activities that might endanger or threaten species, and the CWA maintains
requirements for ‘nonpoint’ sources of water pollution arising out of logging activities
(Rasband, 2004). These effects on land use, however, are tangential to the primary
purposes of these federal regulations, which are to protect endangered species and water
quality—not to govern the details of how private forest resources are to be directly and
generally managed. Rather, states are responsible for direct regulation of private forest
management activities, by establishing stand density, reforestation and riparian buffer
zone requirements, governing clear-cutting practices, and implementing a wide variety of
other best management practices (Laitos et al., 2006, p. 849).22
It is true that federal statutes can influence state regulation of forest management, as
states may pass or modify state laws, such as riparian buffer zone regulations, for the
purpose of meeting federal clean water or endangered species requirements. Nonetheless,
analysis of both US judicial precedent and traditional accepted forest management
practices helps distinguish the permissible influencing effects of federal statutes on state
regulation from impermissible federal intrusion upon primary state regulatory authority
over forest management. Courts have recognized the constitutional validity of both the
ESA and the CWA under the Commerce Clause, despite certain limitations placed by
those statutes on private land use.23 Private forest management has never undergone such
judicial scrutiny, as the federal government has never attempted to directly regulate
private forest management activities by federal act, and courts have consistently recognized,
as noted above, the ‘quintessential’ authority of states to regulate land uses, like forest man-
agement. Thus, Commerce Clause jurisprudence has yet to extend to private forests in a
way that would conflict with the accepted practice of direct state regulation of private
forest activities.24
Private land use activities may also be affected when the federal government enters into
an international treaty regulating certain natural resources—a principle governed to this
day by the 1920 US Supreme Court case of Missouri v. Holland (Missouri, 1920). As noted
below, however, Missouri may be distinguished on its facts, as the treaty in that case, much
like the ESA and CWA, regulates resources tangentially related to the direct land use activ-
ities of private property owners, and the federal government has never asserted, by treaty,
authority over specific private forest management activities traditionally regulated by
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states. In short, though federal statutes and treaties may have an effect on the land use
activities of private landowners, the federal government has never before claimed, nor
been judicially conferred the authority to directly manage private forest management
activities.
Due to US federalism, the types of forest directives that might arise out of either a
post-Kyoto climate framework or a stand-alone forest treaty will necessarily affect the
viability of the treaty within the US and will thus have an effect on treaty formation in the
first instance, given the important role of the US. Scholars have noted that international
efforts to regulate forest management activities by way of a global treaty would ‘mandate
some degree of harmonization of forestry practices’ (Lipschutz, 2001, p. 159). A binding
treaty, providing prescriptive forest management directives at the national level, however,
would undoubtedly involve regulation of private US forests. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) has cited several desired forest management results that could
theoretically be achieved through a prescriptive, ‘traditional governance’ framework.25
These results include ‘increasing and maintaining forest area’ and ‘increasing and main-
taining site-level carbon density’ (Nabuurs et al., 2007). Though it is true that these results
can be accomplished by voluntary, market-based programmes, the IPCC leaves open the
mechanism by which they might be achieved. Thus, it is feasible that binding forest man-
agement practices could require signatory nations to ‘increase and maintain forest area’ by
prescribing, for example, maintenance of partial forest cover on all forested lands, imple-
mentation of soil erosion reduction programmes, or limitation of fertilizer use.26
A likely response to such a treaty would be a flood of litigation and constitutional chal-
lenges in the US, with both private forest owners and states resisting the federally forced
management of their lands.27 The federal government, due to judicial complications,
would be unable to effectively implement throughout most of the US any international
forest agreement that prescribed forest management practices on private forest lands,
hamstringing the US’s ability to meet its treaty obligations. Furthermore, federalism may
provide the US with a veto player incentive during negotiations on any treaty seeking to
establish legally binding forest management directives, whether it be within a post-Kyoto
framework or a stand-alone forest regime. Ultimately, federalism acts as an ‘inside-out’
domestic constraint on prescriptive ‘traditional governance’ at both the national and
international levels, just as do ‘outside-in’ international negotiations in Glück et al.
(2009).
If, as we suggest, however, negotiations aimed at forest management focus on volun-
tary, market-based mechanisms, then these judicial and domestic treaty implementation
complications disappear. Private forest landowners would not be forced by the federal
government to manage forests in a particular fashion, thus freeing the federal government
from federalism constraints as it implements the treaty. For example, under a climate
treaty the domestic, mandatory regulation requirements—i.e. carbon emissions reduc-
tions—would fall on industry emitters, not private landowners. Furthermore, under either
a climate treaty or a stand-alone forest treaty, private forest managers would be incentiv-
ized by the market, or by any state regulation of forest management driven by the market,
to manage forests in a way compatible with the sustainability principles established by
forest certification, REDD, ecosystem services, and similar programmes. Such pro-
grammes would lead to behavioural change in private forest management because as the
markets become more robust, an increasing number of private forest owners would realize
the economic benefits from participating in the market and managing forests sustainably.
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Carbon credits, for example, provide a means by which private forest managers can
increase profit margins. Such credits could be gained by increasing stand densities or
developing more robust riparian buffer zones. In addition, foresters might receive pay-
ment from ecosystem service funds aimed at improving water quality or preventing
run-off that would otherwise require the building of detention ponds in municipalities.
Similarly, forest managers might receive payment for the provision of air quality services,
as urban forest programmes seek to remove particulate matter from the air through for-
estry.28 Finally, demand should increase for certified forest products originating from
lands managed in a sustainable fashion. These economic incentives, and the markets pro-
viding them, are especially important as other private forest markets are shrinking—e.g.,
the US pulp and paper industry is rapidly moving overseas, and large paper companies are
offloading landholdings in the US. Thus an improved carbon market providing credit for
REDD-type programmes, forest ecosystem service markets based on watershed protec-
tion, air quality, biodiversity protection, and other services, and a more robust forest certi-
fication market could fill an increasing void in the portfolios of private forest managers in
the US and at the same time induce behavioural change in forest management that will
have a positive environmental impact.
Ultimately, US federalism acts as a legal constitutional driver for decentralization and
the use of bottom-up mechanisms, such as markets that allow the participation of a wide
range of public, private, international and local stakeholders. Because of the need to utilize
forest management to fight climate change, and to capture the multiple other values
provided by sustainable forestry, it is important that the current political power structure
of the major global environmental players be taken into account when negotiating the
shape of binding treaties aimed at forest management. The federalism question will need
to be considered. Because failure to take into account the federalism question in the US
might lead to negotiations supporting prescriptive dictates, which would leave the US
unable to act, domestic institutional structures like federalism place important limitations
on ‘traditional governance’. As such, we next analyze the legal basis supporting the claim
that US federalism would likely not allow the federal government to implement manda-
tory dictates for US private forest owners, and which supports the inclusion of voluntary
mechanisms within either binding stand-alone forest management or climate treaties.
A Legal Basis for US Federalism Concerns
The legal basis upon which the aforementioned federalism question rests is the US
Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Missouri v. Holland. Missouri has been described
as the ‘benchmark’ for the Treaty Clause authority of the federal government to regulate
certain natural resources (Laitos et al., 2006, pp. 1200–1201). The events giving rise to
Missouri began when, on 8 December 1916, the US and Great Britain entered into a treaty
recognizing that ‘many species of birds in their annual migrations traversed many parts of
the United States and of Canada . . . were of great value as a source of food and in destroy-
ing insects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of extermination through lack of
adequate protection’ (Missouri, 1920, p. 431). The two countries agreed to pass domestic
legislation to protect these animals. To that end, the US passed the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act (MBTA) to prohibit the killing, capturing or selling of any migratory birds included in
the terms of the treaty. The state of Missouri brought a claim to prevent a US game warden
from enforcing the MBTA, arguing that the act was unconstitutional as an interference
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with the rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Missouri also supported
its claim based upon the tradition of state control over wildlife. The federal government,
on the other hand, argued the statute was valid under the treaty-making authority granted
to it by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that Article 2 of the Constitution
expressly delegates authority to the national government to create treaties. Furthermore,
Article 6 declares that treaties are made under the ‘authority of the United States’, and fed-
eral laws passed under the Constitution, such as the MBTA, are the supreme law of the
land. The Court found that ‘[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity
of the [MBTA] under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government’ (Missouri, 1920, p. 432). The Court then found that the treaty
did not contravene any specific portion of the Constitution, and thus was valid—unless the
treaty was prohibited by the Tenth Amendment under the facts of the case.29
Had the Court stopped its analysis at the ‘treaty power’ it would seem clear that the US
federal government could enter into an international agreement imposing domestic restric-
tions on forest management practices on private lands. However, the Court’s subsequent
Tenth Amendment analysis, as applied to the specific facts of Missouri, argues against
such a conclusion, especially considering that the resource in question is private forest-
lands.30 For example, the Court noted that ‘wild birds are not the possession of anyone . . .
[t]he whole foundation of the State’s rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of
birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a
thousand miles away’ (Missouri, 1920, p. 434). Thus, the migratory nature of the birds
weakened the state’s claim of sovereign authority over them, and because the MBTA
involved an international resource that moved across international boundaries, Congress
could enter into an international treaty to regulate the resource without violating the ‘gen-
eral terms of the Tenth Amendment’ (Missouri, 1920, p. 434).
Accordingly, the Court’s Tenth Amendment analysis is apparently limited to the spe-
cific fact pattern of Missouri, resting upon the Court’s characterization of the birds as
being wildlife of a transitory nature. Furthermore, there is no question that the federal gov-
ernment has historically regulated wildlife, so that general invocation of the Tenth
Amendment by states could not overcome the federal government’s treaty authority to
regulate that particular resource.31 This is a very different scenario from private forest
management, which, as discussed above, has traditionally been considered a ‘land use’
regulatory responsibility reserved to states. Forests are indeed ‘in possession’ of specific
public and private landowners and are obviously not migratory. These facts would likely
argue against the domestic validity of an international treaty regulating private forest
management, and for the invocation of a Tenth Amendment power reserved to the states.
It should be noted that the Missouri Court further stated:
[h]ere a national interest of very nearly first magnitude is involved. It can be
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. The subject
matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein. But
for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with.
We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a
food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It
is not sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is in vain, and were it otherwise,
the question is whether the United States is forbidden to act. (Missouri, 1920, p. 435)
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It may very well not be ‘sufficient to rely upon the States’ to properly regulate forest
management.32 Also, climate change is indeed a ‘national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude’, which can only be addressed ‘by national action in concert with that of
another power’.33
As noted, however, the Tenth Amendment analysis of the Court, relying primarily on the
migratory nature of the birds and the lack of ‘possession’ by any party, coupled with the his-
tory of state regulatory authority over land uses such as private forest management, would
likely prohibit a Missouri-type ruling on challenges to an international forest management
treaty. If, as we believe, private forest management remains a power reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment, then the federal government would not be able to implement
prescriptive, ‘traditional governance’ forest management directives on private lands
pursuant to an international treaty. Any attempt to do so would result in Tenth Amendment
judicial challenges, likely brought by both private landowners and state governments.
Conclusion
In order to most effectively address climate change and preserve the numerous other eco-
system services provided by sustainable forestry, global forest management should be
consolidated into a more formalized agreement. Achieving such an agreement will depend
in large part not only on whether the US is willing to lead the international community in
crafting management practices, but also whether the US would even be able to implement
any ensuing treaty given its federalist governance system. US federalism hinders its ability
to enter into a legally binding international agreement that seeks to directly regulate pri-
vate forest owners. The case of Missouri v. Holland, along with implications arising out of
the history of private forest management regulation in the US, indicates that the US’s
treaty-making authority is unlikely to trump states rights in the area of forest management.
To avoid a global forest treaty based upon ‘traditional governance’ and prescriptive
mandates that run afoul of US federalism principles, market-based initiatives like REDD,
forest certification, and ecosystem services transaction programmes would likely provide
the best opportunity to achieve global forest management goals, and do so with the
uncompromised leadership and participation of the US. Such mechanisms represent the
increasingly utilized neo-liberal approach to environmental governance, which posits that
objectives can be best achieved not through the state establishing targets and enforcing
compliance, but rather through voluntary measures and market-based policies
(Humphreys, 2008), and also support the trend toward decentralization and ‘bottom-up’
approaches to global forest management.
Ultimately, though international treaties might require the US to implement and create
a market for these programmes, the private landowners participating within the
programmes would do so on a voluntary basis. Simply, private landowners would be
incentivized by forest certification, ecosystem services or REDD markets to manage for-
ests sustainably, but would not be forced to do so by traditional prescriptive regulation.
Thus, a federalism conflict between the federal and state governments would be avoided.
Moreover, market-based forest programmes would provide additional benefits beyond
addressing US federalism concerns. They might play a role in further persuading the US to
support an international climate change and/or stand-alone forest treaty, as costs of
climate change regulation could be greatly reduced by the incorporation of such
programmes. In the end, failure to consider the effects of domestic legal limitations on a
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crucial leader in the areas of both global forest management and climate change would
continue the trend of leaving global forest management concerns, and the global solutions
needed to address them, in the hands of diverse, uncoordinated national interests.
Notes
1. For a chronology of forest treaty discussions since 1992, see Davenport and Wood (2006).
2. Later rounds of the UNFF have at least shown increased attention to the issue of a binding treaty (see Daven-
port, 2007).
3. Also see Reiner (2001) and Scholz (2004).
4. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs has advocated that ‘[a]t Copenhagen in December
2009, it is crucial that countries agree to include reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
tion in a post-2012 climate regime’ (UN-DESA No. 16).
5. Scholars have described the US Constitution as embodying ‘a very limited concentration of powers in the
nation’s central institutions . . . the original allocation of jurisdiction to the national government was . . .
modest with the unspecified, but apparently broad, residue being left with the states’ (Watts, 1987, p. 769).
6. Other federal systems might also face issues of domestic implementation—e.g. Canada’s constitution grants
the provincial governments exclusive responsibility for forest management (Boyd, 2003).
7. In this article, we refer only to ‘explicit’, or formalized, regimes (Krasner, 1982).
8. Also, see generally, Glück et al. (2005).
9. See generally, Putnam (1988). Other scholars have noted the trend towards a bottom-up approach for forests
(Agrawal et al., 2008 and Glück et al., 2005).
10. Though REDD programmes have heretofore been aimed at the developing world, REDD provides a model of
the type of market-based mechanisms that could be implemented in the US in order to avoid federalism issues.
11. See discussion below, pp. 9–12.
12. The 2007 UNFF talks resulted in a non-legally binding statement of principles, meant to promote sustainable
forest management worldwide by encouraging national action and international cooperation (UNFF,
2006–2007). Some scholars claim that the instrument ‘looks unlikely to achieve any real consolidation of
global forest governance’ (Gueneau & Tozzi, 2008, p. 551). Also, see Kunzmann (2008).
13. Though the Kyoto Protocol introduced the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for carbon offset projects
in developing countries, the CDM has proved inadequate, as only three forest CDMs exist (http://www.car-
bonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1463).
14. For discussion of Kyoto’s failure to adequately incorporate forest management, see Levin et al. (2008) and
Cashore et al. (2006).
15. See Reiner (2001).
16. For discussion of the economic incentives provided by forests, see Davenport (2005, pp. 123–124). Also,
note carbon credit projected price data at EIA (2009).
17. In our search of the literature, we found no such instances.
18. For more discussion see Reiner (2001), Davenport (2005), and Scholz (2004).
19. Though related more to political sovereignty than to concerns about federalism, the US’s opposition to a for-
est convention in 1997 is partially explained by its ‘fears about environmental requirements finding their
way into the agreement’ (Porter, 2000, p. 209).
20. See Mugler (1887).
21. Citing Hess (1944, p. 44): ‘[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments’.
22. Furthermore, logging is only one activity potentially undertaken by forest owners. Non-industrial uses of pri-
vate forests are even more clearly in the zone of power reserved to the states, which implement zoning and
development laws. The federal government cannot establish zoning schemes for states or municipalities, and
some municipalities use zoning as a means of regulating land use related to forestry (Laitos et al., 2006, p. 871).
23. See generally, Goldstein & Thompson Jr. (2006, pp. 1086–1102) (ESA) and Rasband (2004, pp. 795–796
and pp. 822–823) (CWA).
24. Beyond the scope of this article is exploration of whether federal regulation of private forests could
withstand judicial scrutiny under potentially expanded Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
25. Though climate negotiations are primarily concerned with forest carbon only, the IPCC’s findings are
relevant to future UNFF negotiations, as the UNFF has also recognized the role of forest carbon in address-
ing climate change.
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26. For further explanation of how these results might be achieved, see Nabuurs et al. (2007, p. 551).
27. Claims might also be brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, granting protection for
private property owners by establishing that property may not be taken by the government without ‘just com-
pensation’.
28. An example of a programme providing such services is an urban forestry project undertaken in Tucson,
Arizona, where 500 000 mesquite trees have helped save the municipality thousands of dollars by
reducing runoff, and are also expected to remove 6500 tons of particulate matter annually (Rasband,
2004, p. 1155).
29. The Court stated: ‘The language of the Constitution as to the supremacy of treaties being general, the ques-
tion before us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the present supposed exception is
placed’ (Missouri, 1920, p. 432). The Court also stated: ‘No doubt the great body of private relations usually
fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power . . . it only remains to consider the
application of established rules to the present case’ (Missouri, 1920, p. 434–435).
30. Importantly, the Court stated: ‘We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making
power; but they must be ascertained in a different way’ (Missouri, 1920, p. 433). In addition, it is unclear that
the Court today would even consider the facts of Missouri under the treaty-making power, as ‘since 1937 the
Supreme Court’s broad reading of the Commerce Clause as a source of congressional power has led to more
reliance upon it to uphold federal regulation of wildlife’ (Coggins et al., 2007, p. 178). In fact, the MBTA
itself was subsequently justified independently under the Commerce Clause (e.g. see Andrus v. Allard,
1979).
31. In Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Resources, the court characterized the holding in Missouri as
the authority of ‘the federal government to preempt state control over wildlife under federal legislation
implementing a . . . [t]reaty’ (Palila, 1979, p. 993).
32. Indeed, state governments are likely to exercise less stringent environmental controls over forest manage-
ment activities on state owned and private forests, than is the federal government over federal forests. For
discussion, see Koontz (2002).
33. This statement arguably does not apply, however, regarding forest management in isolation from the climate
issue. It seems clear that the US could responsibly and sustainably manage its forests without reliance on the
cooperation of any other nation.
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